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COOPER PRICE

Democracy, like many concepts in political science, escapes easy
definition. But it’s safe to say that most models of democracy include some
notion of political competition, and of the peaceful transfer of power from one
group to another. As Adam Przeworski puts it, “Democracy is a system in
which parties lose elections.”¹ But by this metric, Japan hardly qualifies as a
democracy. For the vast majority of its postwar history, the country has been
ruled by a single political party - the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP).
After a landmark electoral reform introduced proportional representation in
1994, many observers declared an end to the “1955 system” of LDP
dominance.² For a brief moment in the early 2010s, it seemed that regular
two-party competition between the LDP and Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)
had finally become a reality.³ But the past eight years have seen a return to the
“old days” of LDP control. After a crushing electoral defeat in 2012, the DPJ
was forced back into the political wilderness. In the years since, the LDP has
decisively reestablished its control over the Diet and premiership, while the
opposition has returned to its previous state of fragmentation and electoral
weakness.
The causes of LDP resurgence are varied, and scholars have explored many
potential explanations for the party’s post-2012 recovery. But one area that
has been relatively overlooked is the relationship between LDP success and the
phenomenon known as “depoliticization.” As we will discuss at greater length
in the literature review, depoliticization theorists like Matthew Flinders and
Matt Wood recognize three main forms of depoliticization: governmental,
societal and discursive. In this paper, we will focus on the first two categories.
Governmental depoliticization is generally characterized as the “denial of
political contingency and the transfer of [state] functions away from elected
politicians”.⁴ In the Japanese context, this kind of depoliticization is
manifested through the de facto assumption of control over policymaking
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authority by bureaucratic agencies like the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI), which emerged as the primary originators of economic policy
in the postwar era.⁵ Over the course of this period, the LDP developed a
symbiotic relationship with Japan’s administrative state, and with the
country’s leading corporations. At the height of the 1955 system, scholars like
Chalmers Johnson characterized the LDP regime as a technocracy controlled
by an axis of bureaucrats, professional politicians and business interests.⁶
Societal depoliticization refers to a “sense of diminished interest in public
affairs on the part of the public”.⁷ Such attitudes can be cultivated by a variety
of actors in civil society.
The current literature on LDP electoral strength would benefit from an
analysis of the unique role that depoliticization plays in creating a favorable
political climate for LDP dominance. Scholars like Thomas Feldhoff have
noted that “depoliticisation [sic], which extends across all governing levels in
Japan and across multiple policy spheres, is in the interest of those parties in
power.” Feldhoff says that this “is a key message that has rarely been touched
upon in the literature so far”.⁸
This paper seeks to fill that gap by applying the general model of
depoliticization to the specific case of Japan. We will explore the ways in which
historical, social and political factors have contributed to widespread societal
and governmental depoliticization, and how these processes laid the
groundwork for the LDP’s post-2012 resurgence. We will examine how the two
aforementioned forms of depoliticization reinforce each other in
contemporary Japan, exemplifying the “interplay” between governmental and
societal depoliticization that Wood and Flinders describe in their 2014 article
“Rethinking Depoliticisation: Beyond the Governmental.”⁹ In the Japanese
case, linkages between governmental and societal depoliticization are
particularly clear with regard to the 2009-12 DPJ government and its failure
to forge a strong two-party system. The DPJ’s failure, which was caused in
large part by governmental depoliticization, contributed to societal
depoliticization in the long run (as expressed by low voter turnout and
generally limited political participation).
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First, we discuss the scholarly literature on LDP dominance, analyzing some of
the most important factors behind the party’s half-century of electoral success.
Then we examine the ways in which governmental depoliticization prevented
the DPJ from fulfilling its electoral mandate during the party’s brief stint in
government from 2009-12, and how this failure may have contributed to
internal splits within the opposition (which increased the LDP’s electoral
strength) and fueled societal depoliticization. Next, we discuss the
depoliticizing role played by the Japanese educational system and the media,
and the broader relationship between societal depoliticization and LDP
success. Finally, we consider the implications of depoliticization for Japan’s
political future.
LITERATURE REVIEW

In the second half of the twentieth century, the “dominant-party” model of
democracy (as exemplified by cases like South Korea, Taiwan, Mexico and
Italy) seemed to present a strong alternative to competitive, multiparty
democracy. But the last few decades have generally seen a decline in the
prevalence of dominant party systems. This trend can be observed in countries
as diverse as Italy, Mexico, South Korea and Taiwan. But the Japanese Liberal
Democratic Party is a notable outlier in its avoidance of dominant party
decline. While the LDP can no longer claim to be electorally undefeated, the
party has still governed (whether as a majority or in coalition) for roughly 22
out of the 26 years since the end of the one and a half party system. This record
is especially unusual in light of the fact that Japan has possessed ostensibly
democratic political institutions since 1947. Furthermore, it sets Japan apart
from neighboring countries like South Korea and Taiwan, which both
overcame a legacy of single-party dominance. While there are some major
historical and political differences between these three countries, they are a
compelling set of cases to compare. All three followed a general policy of stateled capitalist development for most of the 20th century. They also share
similar long-term economic challenges (e.g. aging demographics and
diminished GDP growth prospects), broadly comparable electoral systems,
and the common institutional legacy of Imperial Japan.¹¹ South Korea, in
particular, seems an apt counter model as the various iterations of Korea’s
conservative dominant party were “deliberately modeled” after the LDP.¹² In
addition, the election of Korean leftist Kim Dae Jung in 1997 was an example
of the opposition overthrowing a once-dominant party in the wake of a major
economic disaster (the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis) that revealed the failings
of the status quo. The 2008 recession provided a similar opportunity for the
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Japanese opposition, but the DPJ government collapsed after just four years
in power (and hasn’t regained control in the eight years since).
Despite the aforementioned similarities in political climate, center-left
opposition parties in South Korea and Taiwan have repeatedly outperformed
their Japanese counterparts in recent years.¹³ This raises an important
question: how has the LDP managed to overcome the post-Cold War
legitimacy crisis (that felled virtually all other dominant party democratic
regimes) and survived as a viable, and arguably still monopolistic, political
force? Scholars have not come to any definitive consensus with regard to the
causes of continued LDP dominance, but a variety of different explanations
have been proposed.
Some scholars, like Karen Cox and Leonard Schoppa, have observed that
the LDP exploits certain weaknesses built into Japan’s election reform laws.
One such weakness is the fact that Japanese law does not allow candidates in
single-member districts to list themselves under multiple party tickets. This
creates a structural disadvantage for small parties in Japan, as they must take
the “ad hoc approach of running candidates here and there”.¹⁴ Minor parties
in Italy are spared this problem thanks to electoral reform legislation enacted
in the 1990s, which allowed for multi-ticket candidates.
More significantly, the LDP enjoys several big structural advantages
which reforms have been incapable of eliminating thus far. One of these
advantages is the disproportionate voting power of pro-LDP rural districts.
The LDP has long relied on the rural vote as a key pillar of support, and it
continues to do so today. The party “systematically [wins] rural constituencies
with low ratios of population to representative,” as this group is especially
“dependent on redistributive benefits” to which the LDP possesses “nearly
uninterrupted access”.¹⁵ As Masahisa Endo, Robert Pekkanen and Robert
Reed point out in “The LDP’s Path Back to Power,” the agricultural lobby’s
continued alignment with the LDP helped the party mobilize voters to unseat
the DPJ’s legislative majority in 2012.¹⁶
This brand of pork-barrel politics speaks to a larger underlying factor
that Japanese reformers have not sufficiently addressed: pervasive clientelism.
This clientelism largely benefits the LDP, as noted by scholars like Ethan
Scheiner and Filippo Tronconi. This is because the country’s “clientelistic and
centralized governmental system” ensures that the ruling party/coalition in
the Diet has great control over dispersal of funds at all levels of government.¹⁷
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This creates incentives for local politicians to align themselves with the party
most likely to win national elections (and therefore best able to dispense
patronage/pork barrel spending to their district). The LDP has had decades to
build up a network of fiercely loyal politicians, who enjoy firm support from
koenkai.¹⁸ Thus, even after substantial electoral reform, the LDP still enjoys
the advantage of a “deep pool of local politicians who could mobilize voters for
the party”.¹⁹ Organizationally speaking, it has proven difficult for the
opposition to catch up. Ellis Krauss and Robert Pekkanen also emphasize the
continued role of koenkai in the LDP party machine, arguing that koenkai are
useful in gathering the votes of “ticket-splitters” who vote for opposition
parties in PR contests but are persuaded to vote LDP in SMD races due to the
influence of “personal” politics.²⁰ This kind of particularism has gone “hand in
hand” with outright corruption and “money-power politics”.²¹ As the largest,
most well-organized and well-funded party in Japan, it stands to reason that
the LDP would thrive in such a political climate.
Finally, the LDP’s success is undoubtedly aided by high levels of
factionalism and fracturing among Japan’s numerous opposition parties. Like
many of the aforementioned factors, this is a long standing issue. In the 2000
election, for example, a failure to coordinate among the various opposition
parties granted the LDP around 68 more district seats than it would have
otherwise gained - enough to tip the balance of power in the Lower House.²²
This kind of result was typical until the 2000s, when the opposition began to
consolidate in earnest around the DPJ. But the DPJ proved vulnerable to
fragmentation, and collapsed entirely in the mid-2010s.²³
While each of the aforementioned explanations may hold some
explanatory power, the literature on LDP dominance would benefit from an
application of depoliticization theory to the Japanese case. There is already
some scholarly support for a “depoliticization hypothesis” to (at least partially)
explain the LDP’s resilience. Eric C. Browne and Kim Sunwoong claim that the
failure of dominant parties like Italy’s Christian Democracy (CD) and Mexico’s
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was primarily caused by an erosion of
voter confidence (due to decades of corruption), which grew so intense that it
triggered party fragmentation as breakaway factions saw an opportunity to
capitalize on anti-establishment fervor. In Japan, however, erosion of voter
confidence hasn’t led to widespread support for opposition parties. Instead, it
has generated “apathy toward the political system itself”.²⁴ This has led to
A term which refers to local “political machines” that build
²³ Purnendra Jain, "Japan’s 2019 upper house
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decline in turnout and participation. While Browne and Kim frame these
trends as a weakness for the LDP, it could be interpreted as a strength because
apathy prevents the emergence of a bottom-up political movement that could
generate grassroots opposition outside of the LDP-dominated system of
formal electoral politics. Furthermore, the LDP’s superior ability to mobilize
the “organized vote” (through well-developed koenkai networks) gives the
party a general advantage in low-turnout elections. This view is reinforced by
Hirotaka Kasai, who claims that Japan’s business and political elite have
intentionally fostered a climate of cynicism and indifference towards Japan’s
constitutional principles, in order to facilitate the acceptance of undemocratic
policies that protect those in power from public scrutiny.²⁵ Examples of such
policies include the anti-transparency State Secrets Law enacted in 2013.²⁶
While Browne, Kim, Kasai and others have identified a general culture of
apathy and “depoliticization,” there does not yet appear to be a firm scholarly
consensus regarding the root causes of Japanese depoliticization, nor has
there been sufficient analysis of the relationship between depoliticization and
LDP dominance.
This paper will analyze the Japanese case by applying a theory of
depoliticization advanced by Matthew Flinders and Matt Wood, who have
emerged as leading scholars on the subject in recent years. In “Rethinking
Depoliticization: Beyond the Governmental”, Wood and Flinders distinguish
between three separate but mutually reinforcing categories of depoliticization.
The first is “governmental” depoliticization, which is characterized as a
mode of statecraft that transfers decision making responsibility away from
actors who can be held directly accountable to the public (e.g. elected officials)
and places it in the hands of “apolitical” institutions like regulatory agencies,
central banks, and the judiciary.²⁷
The second is “societal” depoliticization, which encompasses any process
by which the “social deliberation surrounding [political issues] gradually
erodes,” often resulting in low levels of political participation among the
citizenry.²⁸ This kind of depoliticization can be carried out by a wide range of
actors in civil society, including media outlets, social movements and business
associations.²⁹
The final category of depoliticization is “discursive.” Discursive
depoliticization refers to the use of ideas and language as a tool to “naturalize”
political issues by making certain options seem inevitable, and opposition to
those options irrational.³⁰ This concept draws on the work of Marxist
25
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Having established a basic understanding of depoliticization and its two
main forms (governmental and societal), we can now discuss the role that each
type of depoliticization plays in the LDP’s return to power. We will begin with
governmental depoliticization.
GOVERNMENTAL DEPOLITICIZATION AND THE DPJ’S FAILURE

Governmental depoliticization has a complex and important relationship
to the Japanese case. The LDP has traditionally maintained a tacit
arrangement with Japan’s powerful, highly autonomous bureaucracy. For
much of the postwar era, bureaucratic agencies were allowed to take the lead
in the policymaking process, and the role of the LDP-controlled Diet was to
approve (or occasionally reject) bureaucratic proposals. This technocratic
system is a clear example of governmental depoliticization, as the legislature
and prime minister (the democratically accountable branches of government)
generally take their cue from unelected policy experts and the private business
interests that the bureaucracy tends to represent due to Japan’s amakudari
system (an implicit quid pro quo exchange which involves state officials being
rewarded with lucrative positions on the boards of companies they were
charged with overseeing, in return for lax regulation).³³
In 2009, it seemed like things might finally change. Taking advantage of
1990s-era electoral reforms and a succession of short-lived, scandal-ridden
LDP premierships, the DPJ won a landmark electoral victory “by promising to
turn politicians into the true decision-makers and end the practice of
bureaucrats calling the shots on behalf of ministries instead of the people”.³⁴
31
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philosopher Antonio Gramsci, who emphasized “the role of language and
culture in relation to political debates.”³¹ There is a great deal of overlap
between discursive and societal depoliticization, as “these two forms or modes
of depoliticisation are both distinctive, interrelated, and to some extent even
parasitical”.³² For the purposes of this paper, we will limit ourselves to a
discussion of societal and governmental depoliticization, for two main
reasons. First, discursive depoliticization is often produced by the same actors
(in the state and civil society) as societal depoliticization. Second, a proper
understanding of discursive depoliticization requires an extensive
engagement with theoretical literature that is beyond the limited scope of this
paper. Discursive techniques are employed by many of the same institutions
that promote societal depoliticization, such as the media and education
system.
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Prime Minister Hatoyama pledged to act on this electoral mandate, and
implement a “shift in ‘sovereignty’ [...] to end the bureaucracy-controlled
government and establish a true people-centered government”.³⁵ Hatoyama
planned to achieve this grand promise through a set of institutional reforms.
The new administration quickly moved to abolish vice-ministerial meetings
(which were traditionally a vehicle for the bureaucracy to decide on policy that
the politicians would subsequently enact). Hatoyama’s government also
created an administrative firewall between politicians and bureaucrats,
constraining the latter to the role of “providing basic data and information”
rather than determining what policies are actually implemented.³⁶ The overall
goal was the transfer of policymaking authority away from unelected, LDP-era
bureaucrats and its centralization in the hands of elected DPJ cabinet
ministers.³⁷
Unfortunately for the DPJ’s would-be reformers, decades of
governmental depoliticization had swollen the bureaucracy’s role in
governance to such an extent that bureaucratic compliance was necessary to
accomplish virtually any policy objectives. Political appointees lacked the
policy experience to effectively manage their ministries without direction from
career officials, and the sudden exclusion of career officials damaged
bureaucratic morale.³⁸ The abolition of vice-ministerial meetings also
backfired in many respects. Under the old system, the prime minister would
influence policy making by informally participating in vice-ministerial
meetings to communicate the government’s agenda to bureaucrats (using the
deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary as an intermediary). The loss of this
communication channel created a disconnect between the policymakers who
made the decisions and the officials responsible for implementing them.³⁹ The
deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary (CCS) could no longer function as the prime
minister’s liaison to the bureaucracy, and as a result the cabinet’s policy
making power actually weakened.⁴⁰ Over the next few years, the DPJ’s poor
relationship with the bureaucracy would result in a series of policy failures,
dooming the reformers’ dream of repoliticizing Japan’s governing process.
Ironically, the long-term effect of DPJ rule was increased societal
depoliticization, as indicated by steadily decreasing voter turnout rates in
recent elections.⁴¹
The costs of breaking with the bureaucracy had already begun to
materialize by 2010. Hatoyama resigned his premiership on June 2, after
abandoning a campaign pledge to relocate Marine Corps Air Station Futenma,

base relocation in a negative light.⁴² The Japanese media, for reasons we will
later explain, is typically willing to report official leaks with little corroboration
or context, and this case was no exception. The press “utterly [failed] to
explain to the people the true nature of the power struggle that was going on
or to treat the leakers with a due degree of skepticism.”⁴³ As a result,
Hatoyama “completely surrendered” and abandoned the relocation effort.⁴⁴
Under Hatoyama’s successor Kan Naoto, it became even clearer that the
DPJ could not effectively govern without bureaucratic support. During his
time as Hatoyama’s finance minister, Kan’s lack of economic expertise had
forced him to rely on memos prepared by bureaucratic advisors. This
experience changed his prior anti-bureaucratic outlook, and when Kan
became prime minister he took several measures to break down Hatoyama’s
“firewall” between politicians and career officials.⁴⁵ Still, Kan refused to
reinstate the vice-ministerial meetings, despite “basically admitt[ing] that the
old vice-ministerial meeting was necessary for policy coordination”.⁴⁶
In 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake and subsequent FukushimaDaiichi nuclear meltdown would test the limits of the DPJ’s ability to govern
without bureaucratic direction. This disaster revealed the pitfalls of
Hatoyama’s hardline reform effort, as “inter-agency coordination was needed
at various working levels” to address the myriad of problems caused by the
earthquake and meltdown.⁴⁷ Since the DPJ had “identified inter-agency
policy coordination as the jurisdiction of political leaders” and had limited
bureaucrats’ ability to contact officials or politicians from other ministries, the
“network for inter-agency coordination within the government [...] had
basically been destroyed.” Poor coordination greatly delayed the government’s
response in regard to certain forms of complicated relief assistance which
required involvement by multiple ministries.⁴⁸ This “crisis of crisis
management” was politically devastating for Kan, and a vote of no confidence
forced his resignation in August of 2011.⁴⁹
The failures of Hatoyama and Kan would haunt the next DPJ prime
minister, Noda Yoshihiko. Understanding that path dependency had limited
the DPJ’s ability to govern without heavy bureaucratic input, Noda quickly
reintroduced the vice-ministerial meeting (in all but name), and generally
allowed the bureaucracy to re-acquire its hold on the reins of power.⁵⁰ Not
only did Noda demolish what was left of the Hatoyama-era “firewall”, he also
proved willing to reverse long standing DPJ political stances upon urging from
42
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his technocratic advisors. Specifically, Noda acquiesced to an increase in the
consumption tax that was proposed by Ministry of Finance officials.⁵¹ This
move was particularly controversial because the DPJ’s 2009 manifesto had
promised that the party “would not try to raise the levy during the four-year
terms of its Lower House ranks”.⁵² The consumption tax hike was in keeping
with previous increases that the MOF and Treasury had pressured Japanese
governments to propose in the past, despite the typical effect of a “significant
reduction in popularity immediately after [...] raising the possibility of tax
legislation”.⁵³ Thus, Noda’s decision to raise the tax, despite the political risks,
demonstrated the enduring strength of bureaucrats’ agenda-setting power.
As a result, Noda’s administration alienated followers of Ozawa Ichiro, a
powerful factional leader within the DPJ. This anti-Noda contingent felt
betrayed by the Prime Minister’s consumption tax increase and moderate
position on nuclear power. As a result, the party underwent a major split
between Ozawa’s allies and Noda loyalists. Opposition fracturing was a major
factor in smoothing the LDP’s path back to dominant-party status, and at the
present moment the opposition is weaker and more disunified than it has been
at any point since the end of the 1955 system.⁵⁴ This process of fracturing was
accelerated by the 2012 election,⁵⁵ and the LDP has managed to win six
consecutive elections over the course of the decade in the face of opposition
weakness and division.⁵⁶
After years of policy failure, the DPJ under Noda had more or less
capitulated to the Japanese bureaucracy. Generations of governmental
depoliticization had fostered a system in which autonomous inter-agency
coordination (and institutions like the vice-ministerial meeting) were essential
for the effective implementation of policy, especially in a crisis like the
Fukushima meltdown. The DPJ’s inability to repoliticize the governing
process contributed to its electoral downfall in 2012, and to the resurgence of
the LDP as a dominant party in the mid to late 2010s. After successive DPJ
governments either abandoned, reversed or failed to implement their
campaign promises, voters were left “completely confused about what the DPJ
stood for.”⁵⁷ This brings us to the second type of depoliticization described by
Flinders and Wood: societal depoliticization.
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SOCIETAL DEPOLITICIZATION AND LDP ELECTORAL SUCCESS

The DPJ’s failure to fulfill its electoral mandate had a depoliticizing effect
on voters who had hoped in 2009 that the LDP-bureaucratic establishment
would be overcome by a DPJ government. Accordingly, the 2012 election saw
“irresistible apathy on the part of the electorate,”⁵⁸ and the LDP won in a
landslide. Voter disillusionment appears to have persisted, as the LDP won
repeatedly throughout the mid-late 2010s in low-turnout contests. As we will
soon discuss, there is evidence that these low-turnout elections accentuated
the LDP’s organizational advantages and strengthened the party’s position.
The conclusion is clear – “would-be challengers [to the LDP] must find a way
to turn [voters] out and keep them active for more than just a single
election.”⁵⁹ By reneging on its 2009 commitment to end the bureaucracy’s
stranglehold on policy making, the DPJ lost the credibility necessary to
mobilize disaffected voters.
By preventing the DPJ from fulfilling its 2009 electoral mandate,
governmental depoliticization foreclosed the possibility of systemic change
that might repoliticize the populace and spur future opposition victories.
Policy reversals and electoral failure contributed to DPJ (later renamed the
Democratic Party) fracturing and the collapse of Japan’s nascent two-party
system. Thus, we can see that the relationship between governmental and
societal depoliticization is crucial to understanding how Japan “missed its
chance” (for the time being) to fully institutionalize two-party competition.
The impact of societal depoliticization on LDP success is twofold. First,
citizens’ sense of disinterest/disinvestment in politics leads to a decreased
interest in electoral participation. Considering the fact that low voter turnout
has likely benefited the LDP in recent elections,⁶⁰ this is a boon for the ruling
party. A strong case can be made that the “disappointed deactivation” of
“casual voters” helped cause the DPJ’s loss in 2012.⁶¹ Additionally, societal
depoliticization may be at least partially to blame for the lack of an electorally
viable populist movement in Japan. While Japan’s employment rate is
significantly above the OECD average,⁶² Japan faces rising economic
inequality⁶³ and slow wage growth;⁶⁴ problems which have triggered the rise
of populism elsewhere. But new populist parties like Reiwa Shinsengumi have
thus far failed to gain much traction in the Japanese political landscape. And
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while the post-Fukushima era has seen a number of mass demonstrations,
these events have largely failed to coalesce into a politically effective grassroots
pressure campaign. To be sure, societal depoliticization is far from the only
factor that stymies populism and grassroots protest in Japan. But it seems
likely that this type of depoliticization plays some role, for as the next section
will go on to show, societal depoliticization is associated with a decreased
interest in informal political participation.
Our discussion of societal depoliticization will be divided into two parts.
First, we will introduce the concept of “political citizenship,” and explain how
it relates to depoliticization (specifically, in the context of the Japanese
educational system). Then, we will discuss the role of the Japanese media in
undermining active political citizenship and thereby increasing societal
depoliticization.
PART I – POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP

Like depoliticization, political citizenship is a broad and fluid concept.
Here, we will use the definition provided by Bernard Crick: political
citizenship constitutes an "'involvement in public affairs by those who [have]
the rights of citizens: to take part in public debate and, directly or indirectly, in
shaping the laws and decisions of a state.'"⁶⁵ In other words, political
citizenship requires more than legal obligation or national identification; it
requires that the citizen actually engage with the institutions that govern their
country. The link between political citizenship and societal depoliticization is
clear. If a nation’s citizens do not actively engage with the institutions that
govern their country, then it seems to follow that the citizenry in question has
been depoliticized. Thus, when determining whether or not a Japanese
institution contributes to societal depoliticization, we will use the promotion
(or discouragement) of political citizenship as our primary metric.
The first institution that we will consider is the Japanese education
system. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the American
Occupation government made a brief effort to “democratize” Japan’s school
system. Aiming to create a “thick” democracy in Japan, the United States tried
to inculcate democratic values by introducing a “citizenship education
curriculum” that might “nurture a cohort of youth who could then later on
function as active political citizens in Japanese democracy”.⁶⁶ However, this
focus on democratization was short-lived and the civic education program was
“never [...] firmly institutionalised [sic.] in post war Japan.”⁶⁷ Civic education
efforts fell victim to a broader policy shift in the early years of the Cold War, as
the U.S. decided that its geopolitical interests were best served by propping up
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the LDP and “prioritizing ‘economic rehabilitation’” over democratization.⁶⁸
In ensuing decades, the “political socialisation [sic.] process which is seen as
essential for establishing and nurturing political citizenship[...], especially so
for a society that had never operated under popular sovereignty, [was] seen to
have been poorly institutionalized.”⁶⁹ As a result, contemporary Japanese
civic education is not particularly robust. While Japanese law mandates that
schools promote a “public mindset,” students are not generally taught more
than the “basic facts about democracy and social rules,” and they are not often
“required to take part in rule/policy making” exercises or given lessons
concerning the “broader meaning of political skills.” Essentially, Japanese
students are “taught to ‘obey rules’ but are not taught how to make them”.⁷⁰
Overall, political citizenship is ignored (if not actively discouraged) by the
Japanese education system.
The de-emphasis of political citizenship has a close relationship with
overall societal depoliticization. The Japanese people are certainly legal
citizens of their democracy, and national identity is strong in Japan. But
neither legal nor national citizenship demands the kind of deep civic
engagement that political citizenship does. A study commissioned by Tohoku
University in 2015 indicated that Japanese students are “highly accustomed to
the role as a ‘recipient’ of politics and political services”, rather than the role of
active participant.⁷¹ This “recipient" model of political engagement implies a
hard separation between the political class and ordinary people, wherein the
“decision makers” are not part of the same body politic as their constituents.
This worldview is profoundly incompatible with a strong concept of political
citizenship, and seems to reveal a high level of societal depoliticization among
Japanese youth. The survey subjects tended to see politics as a temporary
action, centered around periodic votes or circumscribed moments of
engagement.⁷² Furthermore, the students were often cynical towards voting/
formal participation, but simultaneously uninterested in or critical of
demonstrations/informal politics. While many students expressed a desire to
make positive change in society, they felt as though the avenues of political
action available to them (both formal and informal) were ineffective.⁷³
Generally speaking, there “appears to be a missing ‘pipe’ that sufficiently
connects the interest and concerns that youth have toward society, with
politics and action”.⁷⁴ As previously discussed, one reason for the absence of
such a “pipe” is the lack of substantive civics education in Japanese schools.
Alongside the education system, the Japanese media has also failed to “[equip]
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the youth with the concepts, values, and skills to function as political citizens
in a democracy”.⁷⁵ As we will discuss at length in the following section, the
Japanese press has systematically colluded with the LDP-dominated state
bureaucracy, decisively failing to promote the “sense of ‘inclusion’ [...] in the
political arena” that is necessary for the development of strong political
citizenship.⁷⁶
PART II – THE MEDIA

The media is one of the most important agents in the process of societal
depoliticization, as news outlets are deeply involved with shaping our
interpretation of information. As Laurie Ann Freeman explains in Closing the
Shop: Information Cartels and Japan’s Mass Media, “the power of the media
resides [...] in their ability to channel information and ideas (both to and from
elites, to and from society), to influence the setting and framing of political and
social agendas, and to legitimize certain political economic or social groups
and ideas as they delegitimize others”.⁷⁷ This power functions as a
depoliticizing force in Japanese society (largely to the benefit of the LDP).
Large, mainstream media outlets in Japan tend to frame themselves as
“impartial” and “nonpolitical,” so as to appeal to as wide a reader/viewership
as possible. But the “neutrality” of Japanese media is “that of the closely linked
insider who rarely challenges the status quo”.⁷⁸ Reporters are so closely tied
to the LDP-dominated state ministries that they routinely present progovernment narratives as the only legitimate viewpoint, often basing their
articles very closely on pre-approved press releases.⁷⁹ Certainly, journalists in
other democracies also enjoy close working relationships with government
officials. But Japanese reporters tend to rely on official sources to a far greater
degree than their foreign counterparts. At the turn of the millennium, it was
estimated that up to 90 percent of reporting is based on information provided
by government (and therefore, generally LDP-aligned) sources.⁸⁰ Despite
reform efforts under the 2009-12 DPJ government, media-state relations in
Japan have remained significantly closer than in most other developed
democracies.
This symbiotic relationship between state and media is explained by a
number of institutional arrangements. The Japanese press has often been
characterized as an “information cartel.” This means that newsgathering is
organized according to a set of rules and relationships that “limit the types of
news that get reported and the number and makeup of those who do the
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reporting”.⁸¹ The Japanese media landscape is dominated by collegial
organizations called kisha clubs, which are composed of journalists from
various media outlets. Their purpose is to streamline newsgathering in one
particular area of government – for example, one kisha club might cover the
Ministry of Finance, while another might focus on the Prime Minister and his
cabinet. The members of these clubs are allowed exclusive access to official
sources in their assigned area of government, but in exchange they are
expected to practice self-censorship at the risk of expulsion from the club.⁸²
Kisha reporting is governed by a set of implicit norms, such as the infrequency
of exclusive interviews with sources,⁸³ vague attribution (or outright nonattribution) of quotes from government officials,⁸⁴ and “secret briefings” for
club members that lack the transparency of public press conferences.⁸⁵
These arrangements are mutually beneficial for both the kisha members
and their sources. The journalists are “entitled” to a certain degree of
information-sharing by their sources, and they can generally expect equitable
distribution of this information among all members of the club, with
limitations on favoritism for certain reporters over others.⁸⁶ In exchange,
government officials are able to control the dissemination of information and
avoid being blindsided by unfavorable news stories. Scandals are rarely
broken by kisha club reporters,⁸⁷ and limitations on information exchange
between members of different clubs prevents coordination between
journalists specializing in different areas. This prevents the kind of
collaboration necessary to break big, investigative stories that expose
government corruption.⁸⁸ Furthermore, the compensation structure of large
Japanese media firms creates a strong incentive for reporters to follow the
rules. Many of these companies adhere to a system of more-or-less lifelong
employment, wherein “employees with permanent positions know that if they
lose their job and re-enter the job market at middle age, they may never work
again.” Therefore, “‘[anyone] transgressing the kisha system runs the risk of
losing access and having their career derailed[...] in clinging to this privileged
access, the media[…] becomes beholden to the officials and institutions they
are supposed to cover’”.⁸⁹
While the kisha club cartels may be beneficial for journalists and
bureaucrats alike, those benefits come at the expense of the news-consuming
public. Not only is the public less aware of scandals but everyday reporting is
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done in the style of “press release journalism.” This term derisively refers to
the practice of uncritically repeating official talking points (originating in
government press releases) without doing any outside investigation to
corroborate official claims or find dissenting perspectives.⁹⁰ Cloaked in a
veneer of “impartiality,” press release journalism is nonetheless a “denial of
the existence of choice” that serves to dim public awareness of any political
opposition to the government’s agenda. Considering that the LDP has
maintained a monopoly on political power for the vast majority of Japan’s
postwar history, media-state collusion has generally benefited the LDP and
marginalized its opposition. This dynamic has led Freeman to conclude that
Japan’s cozy media-state relationship is “certainly one of [the factors]”
keeping the LDP in power.⁹¹
The rise of non-print media has proven little obstacle to the kisha system.
Televised news broadcasters are owned by the same major companies that
control newspaper circulation in Japan, and corporate policy typically limits
the independent reporting abilities of television journalists, such that their
primary function is to report on stories that have already been broken by kisha
newspaper reporters. This produces a homogenized media landscape across
multiple platforms, and enables the continued primacy of “press release
journalism” in Japan’s modern media landscape.⁹² The proliferation of digital
media does not appear to have upset this dynamic, as television and print
media continue to play a commanding role in the landscape of Japanese
political news.⁹³ If online, alternative media does in fact possess the potential
to open up Japan’s media shop, then that potential remains untapped for the
time being. Regardless, online media outlets are not immune to the pressures
of kisha-style reporting, as they can still be denied access to official sources
unless they submit to self-censorship.
During the DPJ’s stint in government from 2009-12, the kisha clubs saw
the first real challenge to their stranglehold on political reporting. Prime
Minister Hatoyama Yukio pledged to open up the “closed shop” that controlled
Japanese media, a move that was clearly in the party’s “self-interest since the
DPJ felt Japan’s closed media system favored its Liberal Democratic Party
rivals”.⁹⁴ Hatoyama tried to move away from exclusive, kisha-only briefings in
favor of more transparent press conferences that allowed in foreign journalists
and non-kisha “freelancers” (two groups that the Japanese media
establishment distrusts due to their nonadherence to kisha club rules). Many
of his cabinet ministers soon followed suit. Hatoyama also formally disclosed
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the existence of an LDP-era “slush fund” that prime ministers had used to
“curry political favor” among journalists. However, these actions did not
fundamentally change the kisha system, and the return of the LDP in 2012
foreclosed the possibility of more substantive reforms.⁹⁵
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the LDP has
systematically worked to re-entrench the country’s media cartel. At
government press conferences, Abe rarely takes questions from non-kisha
journalists. On the rare occasion that the Prime Minister or one of his Cabinet
members faces real scrutiny (usually from foreign or freelance reporters), the
resulting stories fail to gain traction in the broader media landscape. For
example, in 2015 Abe was questioned on his government’s refugee policy by a
Reuters reporter. His answer, which suggested that “he had not seriously
considered the refugee issue”, was widely circulated through the global media
ecosystem while remaining “mostly ignored by the big media in Japan”.⁹⁶
But Abe has done far more than simply reinforce pre-existing norms
regarding media behavior. His administration has taken aggressive steps to
incentivize self-censorship in the Japanese press, enacting security legislation
that restricts the public’s access to information. The Abe government has also
used informal techniques of coercion to intimidate media organizations like
the newspaper Asahi Shimbun, a liberal paper that has been openly critical of
the Prime Minister.⁹⁷
Since its return to power in the early 2010s, the LDP has enacted
controversial laws that restrict speech and press freedoms. Most significant for
the Japanese media is the 2013 State Secrets Law. This deeply unpopular law
gave the government great discretion regarding what information can be
classified as a “state secret” and concealed from the press and public.⁹⁸ The
law also increased the penalties for leaking classified information. Critics
worry that this law allows the LDP government to exercise even stricter control
over the public dissemination of information. The government has officially
stated that nuclear power could be considered a national security issue under
this law, which raised concerns in 2014 that the State Secrets Law would be
used to conceal government incompetence or malfeasance surrounding the
Fukushima meltdown response.⁹⁹
For the time being, these concerns remain largely hypothetical. But when
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it comes to the informal suppression of dissenting media, the Abe government
has taken much more concrete action. The administration and its right-wing
supporters have repeatedly attacked the Asahi over its coverage of
controversial historical issues (like the so-called “comfort women” of World
War II), and television broadcasters like NHK have been pressured to selfcensor under the implicit threat of funding loss (as the company’s license fee
revenue depends on government approval).¹⁰⁰ This pressure is suspected to
have caused the firing of three anti-Abe television anchors in March of
2016.¹⁰¹ That same year, Abe’s communications minister publicly asserted
that the government has the authority to censor “politically biased”
broadcasters.¹⁰² Although this sweeping claim has not yet been acted upon, it
illustrates the administration’s attitude of intolerance towards dissent. NGOs
have recognized this turn towards press restriction. The media watchdog
organization Reporters Without Borders lowered Japan’s “press freedom”
ranking in 2016 from 61st to 72nd (out of 180 states).¹⁰³ Today, Japan still
stands diminished at 66th place in the organization’s press freedom index.¹⁰⁴
As previously mentioned, this overrepresentation of government
viewpoints contributes to societal depoliticization. Since the quality of
discourse in a democratic polity is shaped by “the way in which [...]
information is generated and disseminated”,¹⁰⁵ the kisha clubs’ press release
journalism is actively damaging to the opposition’s ability to mobilize voters
and rally them against the LDP-dominated political establishment. This is an
example of the “denial of the existence of choice” that Wood and Flinders
argue is central to societal depoliticization. When the official narrative
becomes the only legitimate one, room for political contestation is removed.
We can see the depoliticizing effects of this process in the 2014 general election
campaign, when opposition viewpoints were systematically undercovered by
the mainstream media, likely encouraging low voter turnout.¹⁰⁶ Low turnout
was particularly beneficial for conservative incumbents in rural areas, as the
“organized vote” of LDP-aligned agricultural cooperatives “gains more weight
when the overall voter turnout declines.”¹⁰⁷ In the same electoral cycle, some
observers also criticized “non-transparency and the biased reporting by the
mainstream media” surrounding the then-ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) trade negotiations.¹⁰⁸ Trade liberalization is a particularly sensitive
issue for the LDP, because it is unpopular with the party’s all-important rural
constituency and is often opposed by the powerful “agricultural policy
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community”.¹⁰⁹ Thus, the LDP benefits from reporting that “continues to
downplay or even ignore critical issues”¹¹⁰ like the proposed trade pact.
Through the promotion of official views at the expense of dissenting ones,
Japanese media outlets serve as de facto “social managers,” undercovering
opposition forces, ignoring controversial issues, and often undermining
protest movements by “showing institutionalized means of conflict resolution
(court cases, meeting with bureaucrats, etc.) in a neutral light while casting
opprobrium over more confrontational, grass-roots activities (human
barricades, etc.)”.¹¹¹ An example of this can be seen in the media coverage of
mass protests that broke out in the wake of the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear
disaster. These demonstrations were given relatively little attention in the
mainstream press, particularly the major conservative paper Yomiuri
Shimbun.¹¹²
Under the kisha club-dominated mode of journalism, “[controversial]
stories are not pursued, wayward politicians are not held accountable, and the
public is [often] left ignorant of fundamental incongruencies in its own
political and economic system”.¹¹³ The kisha clubs discourage serious
“watchdog” reporting on the part of mainstream journalists, and their
exclusive nature cuts off information access for the alternative media outlets
that actually are engaging in independent journalism (e.g. freelance
journalists, foreign reporters and news magazines). Multimedia keiretsu
groups ensure that uncritical “press release journalism” is dominant across all
major media platforms. Finally, the “impartial” public stance of many of these
media outlets discourages critical examination of LDP talking points by
framing them as objective truth. Each of these dynamics contributes to societal
depoliticization and weakens the average person’s sense of political
citizenship, as previously mentioned. If problems are ignored and solutions
are not presented, it is little wonder that an increasing number of Japanese
citizens feel apathetic towards (and are disengaged with) politics.
CONCLUSION: CONNECTING THE THREADS OF DEPOLITICIZATION

To be sure, depoliticization is far from a “silver bullet” explanation that
fully accounts for the LDP’s return to dominant-party status in recent years.
Since the LDP’s loss in 2009 occurred under a set of fairly special and unique
circumstances (which were no longer present by 2012), perhaps some level of
“pendulum swing” back to the LDP was inevitable, regardless of the outcome
of the DPJ’s struggle against the bureaucracy. There were numerous other
factors at play in the 2009 general election, such as the political reverberations
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of the Great Recession, which saw governing parties thrown out of office in
other parts of the world as well. Also, the LDP faced a number of inconvenient
problems/political setbacks around that time, such as a scandal involving the
mass disappearance of employee pension records.¹¹⁴ It is entirely possible
that without this “perfect storm” the LDP would not have lost in 2009, or at
least not by such an immense margin. But all things considered, it is clear that
societal and governmental depoliticization have played at least some role in
smoothing the LDP’s path back to power. Societal depoliticization has long
served to benefit the ruling party, as the postwar education system
discouraged the development of meaningful political citizenship and the
media collaborated with LDP politicians and bureaucrats to restrict the
public’s access to information regarding the “fundamental incongruencies in
its political system” (and regarding the opposition’s response to these
incongruencies).¹¹⁵ Neither of these institutions has been substantively
reformed - Tsukada’s 2015 study indicates that the education system is still
depoliticizing students, and the LDP-press relationship has gotten even more
controlling than the days of Closing the Shop.
All things considered, the LDP’s resurgence confirms Wood and Flinders’
argument that the different forms of depoliticization are mutually reinforcing.
Decades of governmental depoliticization left the opposition party unprepared
to manage the affairs of state without direction from bureaucrats, leading to a
string of policy failures and subsequent capitulations to the bureaucracy.
These failures created intra-party splits in the DPJ, weakening the
opposition’s unity. Furthermore, they fatally undermined voters’ confidence in
the DPJ’s ability to govern, worsening the problem of societal depoliticization
(which was already an issue due to the depoliticizing influence of media and
schools). In other words, the long-term ramifications of governmental
depoliticization serve to increase societal depoliticization in Japan. In turn,
increased societal depoliticization is preventing opposition parties from
regaining power and enacting the kinds of administrative reform that might
repoliticize the Japanese state. If the opposition hopes to break Japan’s
dominant party system once and for all, this “vicious cycle” of depoliticization
must somehow be redressed.
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